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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, static textual passwords are still the most commonly 
used technique for user authentication. It has been well known 
that a usability-security dilemma exists for users’ choices of static 
textual passwords: to resist many attacks especially offline 
dictionary attacks users need to choose stronger passwords, 
however, stronger passwords are normally difficult to remember 
so users often end up with weak but more memorizable passwords. 
There have been many proposed (partial) solutions to the above 
usability-security dilemma about static textual passwords, such as 
enforcing strong password policies, using computer generated 
(stronger) passwords, using dynamic passwords generated by a 
hardware device or sent via an out-of-band (OOB) channel, 
moving to multi-factor user authentication. This poster focuses on 
a solution working at the user interface level: proactive password 
checkers (or meters) which persuade and educate users to choose 
stronger passwords via immediate feedback of the security 
strength of the passwords chosen by users. Proactive password 
checkers can work with other solutions e.g. to enforce a password 
policy by adapting the password strength estimate to the specific 
policy. A password checker may also be used as an offline tool for 
users to evaluate the strength of their current passwords  [1] [2]. 
Proactive password checkers have been widely deployed on the 
user registration pages of many web sites. Figure 1 shows one 
used by Google. All password checkers we are aware of show the 
estimated security strength as a 1-D bar with a textual description 
and/or a numeric strength score. Some password checkers also 
provide hints about how to choose stronger passwords, but very 
few  [1] reveal detail about the underlying password strength 
estimation algorithm. 
 
Figure 1. Google’s proactive password checker in use. 
One of the problems caused by the simple user interface of 
existing password checkers is that users often have little clue 
about why a password is weak and how to further improve it.  
Users often attempt to try more choices until successfully 
escaping from reported “weak” passwords. In other words, even 
when a password checker does help define stronger passwords, 
users are still not well educated about different kinds of risks 
behind password security. When an inappropriate password 
strength estimator is used, this may mislead the user to use 
seemingly strong but actually weak passwords  [3]. The use of 
different password strength estimator by different password 
checkers can cause confusions to users. Yet another problem 
about existing password checkers is that the visual information is 
basically redundant since the 1-D bar carries the same amount of 
information as a numeric score, implying that the power of 
information visualization is not fully explored. 
This poster presents a novel scheme for designing password 
checkers which provides users with immediate feedback about 
multiple threats detected on the current password choice through 
2-D visual guidance in order to influence users to define stronger 
passwords based on the visual feedback. It provides the following 
new features that cannot be found in existing password checkers: 
1) it visualizes multiple threats detected on the current password 
choice simultaneously, 2) it makes use of a 2-D visual space to 
show detected threats in a structural approach, 3) it uses a public 
and standard password strength estimator defined by NIST  [5], 4) 
it provides an open interface to add more static dictionaries; 5) it 
supports a “smart” dictionary to cover password composition rules, 
6) it supports personalized dictionaries through information 
gathered from the user’s social network accounts, 7) it provides 
detailed information about each detected threat to better educate 
users, 8) it is a pure client side solution so can be easily integrated 
into any web site with minimum change to the server, 9) being 
much more complicated than any existing password checker, it is 
still fairly fast and can run in real time even from resource-
constrained devices like smart phones. We name the proposed 
scheme Visual Password Checker (VPC) to highlight its making 
effective use of a 2-D visual space.  
In the following, we describe the general design of the VPC 
framework and then our prototype implementation. Some ongoing 
and future work will be given which concludes the poster abstract. 
2. SYSTEM DESIGN 
The basic idea behind VPC is to extend the simple 1-D bar used 
by all existing password checkers to a 2-D space in which 
different threats detected for the current password choice are 
visualized. Three types of threats are considered in the current 
design of VPC: brute force attacks, static dictionary attacks, rule-
based dictionary attacks, and personalized dictionary attacks. To 
show different threats in a more structural and user-friendly way, 
we render the whole 2-D space as a radar screen where the center 
of the screen shows the current password under evaluation and 
detected threats are shown around the center according to the level 
of risks: the higher the risk is, the closer the threat is placed to the 
center. Specifically, for weak passwords identified through 
dictionary attacks, we place each weak password on a circle 
whose radius is equal to the editing distance between the current 
password and the detected weak password. The threat related to 
brute force attacks is indicated by the password guessing entropy 
defined in Appendix A.2.1 of NIST SP 800-63-1  [5], which 
corresponds to the password strength shown by other existing 
password checkers. The password guessing entropy is shown on 
the x-axis of the 2-D radar screen and its distance to the center is 
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proportional to its value. To make the system more reconfigurable, 
we design an interface allowing the end user to add new static 
dictionaries. A rule-based “smart” dictionary is also included to 
cover password composition rules which are combined with static 
dictionaries to detect more sophisticated but still weak passwords. 
Furthermore, personalized dictionaries are supported by collecting 
information from users’ social network accounts (activated by the 
users manually by logging into their accounts). To differentiate 
different threats from each other, we use different shapes for 
different types of threats and different colors for different risk 
levels. A diagrammatic view of the design is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The visual user interface design of VPC. 
The whole radar screen is also colored differently to visualize the 
overall password strength estimated from all threats detected: red 
denotes high risk, blue denotes medium risk, and green denotes 
low risk where no any threat is shown on the radar screen. 
Furthermore, to better educate users about all threats detected and 
provide tailored recommendations, each visualized threat is 
associated with a hidden tooltip control which will be made 
visible when the user moves her mouse on the threat. 
3. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the above design of VPC, we 
implemented a prototype system using pure client-side web 
programming techniques including HTML5, CSS and JavaScript. 
While HTML5 is relatively new, the elements we used have been 
well supported by most modern web browsers. 
 
Figure 3. A snapshot of the VPC prototype in use. 
One major implementation issue is how to make VPC very 
responsive meaning that the calculation needed should be very 
computationally light even with very large dictionaries. This was 
achieved by representing each dictionary as a tree where each 
valid word is labeled with a “final” flag if it is not a leaf node. A 
web-based tool was also developed to convert a textual static 
dictionary to the required tree format. When comparing the 
current password with entries in a dictionary, Levenshtein 
distance is used to calculate the edit distance. To limit the size of 
the 2-D radar screen, the prototype shows weak passwords with 
an edit distance up to 3. The function of personalized dictionaries 
is demonstrated by incorporating Facebook’s API of single-sign 
on and personal information extraction. Figure 3 shows a snapshot 
of the VPC prototype in use on a registration page. The prototype 
system has been tested on five widely used web browsers and also 
on several mobile devices. To adapt to smaller screens of mobile 
devices, the 2-D radar screen can rescale automatically. The 
prototype is available for testing at http://vpc.cs.surrey.ac.uk. 
4. ONGOING AND FUTURE WORK 
We are currently working on or plan to work on the following 
tasks to further improve the VPC design and implementation: 
? Adding support on more password composition rules such as 
1) rules based on regular expressions, 2) more rules used by 
password crackers, 3) new rules extracted from real world. 
? Identifying and visualizing multiple weak password 
segments (part of the password found in dictionaries). 
? Adding strength estimated by invoking password crackers 
used by real-world password crackers. 
? Replacing the NIST password guessing entropy estimator by 
a more accurate one such as that in  [6]. 
? Adding password strength based on peer pressure  [7]. 
? Showing weak passwords that would appear if the user 
deletes a few characters at the end (which are actually weak 
passwords appearing on previous screens). 
? Improving the coloring scheme to allow smoother transition 
between different risk levels. 
? A user study on the actual performance of VPC on real users. 
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